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THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
With respect to the second question-that of the exceptions to the principle of nonretro-
activity-the ECHR found no fault with the German courts' application of Radbruch's
formula in the light of international human rights. This approach has been criticized as
being "natural lawjurisprudence disguised as enlightened positivism,"41 but the fact remains
that the refusal to accept the GDR practice as a defense serves to uphold basic human
rights, especially the right to life, under an applicable international treaty-a treaty that is
itself positive law. That said, the judgments do not satisfactorily answer the question of
which violations of international law warrant an exception to the principle of nonretro-
activity. Some jurists have suggested that only crimes under international law should be
capable ofjustifying such exceptions.42 The decisions of the Federal Court ofJustice, the
Federal Constitutional Court, and ECHR, however, could be understood as giving a dif-
ferent answer. They are all based on the position that no state has the right to use deadly
force to imprison its own population within its borders. This position, broadly conceived,
may reflect what some commentators see as the emerging human right to democracy: as
applied to this situation, state interests cannot justify restrictions on fundamental human
rights if the purpose of those restrictions is the preservation of an undemocratic order that
does not respect the rule of law. By the same token, the principle of nonretroactivity cannot
be invoked in such circumstances to avoid prosecution for unjustified killing.
Although the Streletz and W. judgments concerned the unique case of the FRG's having
to judge the crimes committed by officials of another state-the GDR-under the laws of
thatvery state, the fundamental tension between positive lawand the demands ofjustice was
the same as that for any state facing its own repressive past. Since the courts of such a state
have the authority to reinterpret statutes, the question is whether defendants can plead that
they could not foresee the change in interpretation and that their acts, therefore, were
excused. The ECHR's reasoning in Streletz would preclude such a plea, however. All state
officials would be required to assess whether their actions would infringe upon fundamental
human rights and have the effect of maintaining a regime that disregards the people's rights
to democracy and to live in a society governed by the rule of law.
BEATE RUDOLF
University of Dilsseldorf/Tulane Law School
NAFTA-arbitration-scope ofjurisdiction to arbitrate-requirement of transparencg-expropriation
resulting from withholding governmental permits and imposing new environmental restric-
tions-damages for expropriation-enforcement of arbitral award
METALCLAD CORPORATIONV. MEXICO. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1.40 ILM 36 (2001),
available at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm>.
NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitral Tribunal, August 30, 2000.
MEXICO V. METALCLAD CORPORATION. 2001 B.C.S.C. 664, available at <http://
www.courts.gov.bc.ca>.
Supreme Court of British Columbia, May 2, 2001.
In 1993, Metalclad Corporation purchased the Mexican company Confinamiento Tecnico
de Residuos Industriales, S.A. de C.V. (COTERIN) in order to build and operate a hazardous-
4 1 MatthiasJ. Herdegen, Unjust Laws, Human Rights, and the German Constitution: Germany's Recent Confrontation
with thePas 32 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 591,602 (1995).42 See, e.g., Thilo Rensmann, BVrfGE95, 96-Mauerschfitzen, inVERFASSUNGSRECHTSPRECHUNG604, 610-11 (Jfrg
Menzel ed., 2000). Similarly, in concurring opinions in the instant casesJudges Loucaides (in both the Streletz and
W. ECHRjudgments, supra notes 1 & 2, respectely) and Levits (,V. ECHRjudgment, supra note 2, paras. 13-18, follow-
ing Loucaides,J.) proposed to find against the applicants because their conduct constituted a crime against humanity.
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waste transfer station and landfill in Guadalcazar, San Luis Potosi. Although the federal
government of Mexico and the state government of San Luis Potosi had granted COTERIN
permits to construct and operate the landfill, the municipality of Guadalcazar denied a
municipal construction permit, and the governor of San Luis Potosi subsequently declared
an area encompassing the landfill to be an ecological reserve. An arbitral tribunal
(Tribunal), convened under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),' found that the lack of transparency in Mexico's regulatory requirements con-
stituted a denial of fair and equitable treatment in violation of NAFTA Article 1105, and
that Mexico's actions to prevent Metalclad from operating the landfill constituted an expro-
priation under Article 1110.2 On Mexico's application to set aside the award, the Supreme
Court of British Columbia-the provincial trial court-held that the Tribunal's findings
concerning fair and equitable treatment and also concerning expropriation based on Mexi-
co's conduct prior to the creation of the ecological reserve were beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration, but that the award could be sustained on the ground that the
ecological decree itself was an expropriation.3
The complex history of the case began in April 1993, when Metalclad obtained a six-month
option to purchase COTERIN, which had previously obtained federal permits to build a
hazardous-waste transfer station and hazardous-waste landfill in the valley of La Pedrera,
seventy kilometers from the city of Guadalcazar. In May, the state government of San Luis
Potosi granted COTERIN a land-use permit for the landfill. In August, the federal gov-
ernment issued a permit to operate the landfill. In September, having been assured by
federal officials that it had all the permits required, Metalclad exercised its option to pur-
chase COTERIN.4
Metalclad began construction of the landfill in May 1994. In October, the municipality
of Guadalcazar ordered that construction stop because no municipal construction permit
had been issued. In November, on the advice of federal officials, Metalclad applied for a
municipal permit and resumed construction. The landfill was completed in March 1995,
but demonstrations prevented its opening. In November, Metalclad and the federal govern-
ment entered an agreement (Convenio) that provided for operation of the landfill while
requiring Metalclad to remediate deficiencies that had been detected by an environmental
audit and to designate thirty-four hectares as a buffer zone for the conservation of endemic
species. The governor of San Luis Potosi, however, opposed the Convenio, and in December,
the municipality denied Metalclad's application for a construction permit. The municipal-
ity subsequentlyfiled an administrative complaint with the federal government challenging
the Convenio. When this complaintwas denied, the municipalityfiled an amparo proceeding
in Mexican courts challenging the denial, and an injunction was issued barring Metalclad
from operating the landfill.5
After further negotiations with the state of San Luis Potosi failed, Metalclad brought its
arbitral claim under Chapter 11 of NAFTA onJanuary 2,1997. In September, three days be-
fore the end of his term, the governor of San Luis Potosi issued an Ecological Decree
declaring an area encompassing the landfill to be a Natural Area for the protection of rare
cactus.6
'North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 ILM 289 & 605 (1993) [hereinafter
NAFrA].
' Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 30, 2000), 40 ILM 36 (2001), at <http://
wwv.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm> [hereinafterArbitral award]. The members of the arbitral tribunal
(Tribunal) were Elihu Lauterpacht (president), Benjamin R. Civiletti, andJos6 Luis Siqueiros.
' Mexico v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 644 (B.C. Sup. Ct. May 2, 2001), at <http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca>
[hereinafter Supreme Courtjudgment].
4 Arbitral award, supra note 2, paras. 28-36, 40 ILM at 41-42.
'Id., paras. 37-56, 40 ILM at 42-44.
Id., paras. 58-63, 40 ILM at 44.
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As an initial matter, the Tribunal held that Mexico was responsible under NAFTA for the
acts of San Luis Potosi and Guadalcazar, noting that this holding was in accordance with
both the text of NAFTA and established rules of customary international law.7 The Tribunal
then turned to Metalclad's claim that Mexico had breached its obligation under NAFTA
Article 1105 (1) to "accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accor-
dance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection
and security."' In interpreting the phrase "fair and equitable treatment," the Tribunal fol-
lowed Article 102 (2)'s instruction to look to NAFTA's stated objectives. 9 "These objectives
specifically include transparency and the substantial increase in investment opportunities
in the territories of the Parties.""° The Tribunal interpreted transparency as imposing two
related obligations. First,
all relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and success-
fully operating investments made, or intended to be made, under the Agreementshould
be capable of being readily known to all affected investors of another Party. There
should be no room for doubt or uncertainty on such matters."
Second, "Once the authorities of the central government of any Party... become aware
of any scope for misunderstanding or confusion in this connection, it is their duty to en-
sure that the correct position is promptly determined and clearly stated .... "2
The Tribunal noted that Metalclad had been assured by federal officials prior to pur-
chasing COTERIN that it had all the permits necessary." The Tribunal further interpreted
Mexico's General Ecology Law of 1988 as giving the federal government exclusive authority
over hazardous-waste landfills and as limiting the municipal government's authority to "con-
struction considerations." 4 The Tribunal faulted the municipality of Guadalcazar for its
delay in asserting the need for a municipal permit, for denying Metalclad the opportunity
to appear at the meeting where the permit application was considered, and for denying
that permit on environmental grounds. 5
id., para. 73,40 ILM at 47. SeeNAFrA, supra note 1, Art. 105,32 ILM at 298 ("The Parties shall ensure that all
necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of the Agreement, including their
observance, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state and provincial governments.").
8 NAFTA, supra note 1, Art. 1105(1), 32 ILM at 639.
9 Id., Art. 102(2), 32 ILM at 297.
10 Arbitral avard, supra note 2, para. 70, 40 ILM at 46 (citing NAFTA, 102(1) (c)). The text of Article 102(1)
provides, in relevantpart: "The objectives of thisAgreement, as elaborated more specifically through its principles
and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and transparency, are to... (c) increase
substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties. .. ." NAFrA, supra note 1, Art. 102(1), 32
ILM at 297. The Tribunal also quoted paragraph 6 of NAFrA's preamble, which says that the parties resolve to
"ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for business planning and investment," and Article 1802(1), which
provides that "[elach Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures and administrative regulations of
general application respecting any matter covered by this Agreement are promptly published or othenvise made
available in such a manner as to enable interested persons and Parties to become acquainted with them." See
Arbitral award, supra note 2, para. 71, 40 ILM at 46.
" Arbitral award, supra note 2, para. 76, 40 ILM at 47.
12 Id., 40 ILM at 47.
" Id., para. 80, 40 ILM at 48.
14 Id., paras. 82-86, 40 ILM at 48. The Tribunal also inferred from the municipality's challenge of the Convenio
that the municipality itself lacked confidence in its right to deny permission for the landfill solely by denying a
municipal construction permit. Id., para. 94, 40 ILM at 49.
" Id., paras. 86-87, 90-93, 40 ILM at 48-49. The Tribunal stated that its conclusion was not affected by the
.environmental measures" provision of Article 1114. See NAFrA, supra note 1, Art. 1114(1), 32 ILM at 642
("Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any
measure otherwise consistentwith this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in
its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns."). The Tribunal reasoned that "[ t ] he
conclusion of the Convenio and the issuance of the federal permits show clearly that Mexico was satisfied that this
project was consistent with, and sensitive to, its environmental concerns." Arbitral award, supra note 2, para. 98,
40 ILM at 49.
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The absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal construction
permit, as well as the absence of any established practice or procedure as to the man-
ner of handling applications for a municipal construction permit, amounts to a failure
on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by NAFTA.
16
The Tribunal further held that Guadalcazar's conduct constituted an expropriation in
violation of Article II10.1' It observed that
expropriation under NAFTAincludes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged tak-
ings of property, such as outrightseizure orformal or obligatory transfer of title in favour
of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property
which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use
or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to
the obvious benefit of the host State.18
The Tribunal held that by permitting Guadalcazar's unfair and inequitable treatment,
Mexico had "taken a measure tantamount to expropriation" 9 and that Guadalcazar's con-
duct, when considered "together with the representations of the Mexican federal govern-
ment, on which Metalclad relied, and the absence of a timely, orderly or substantive basis
for the denial by the Municipality of the local construction permit, amount[s] to an
indirect expropriation.""
Finally, " [a]lthough not strictly necessary for its conclusion," the Tribunal found that the
"implementation of the Ecological Decree" issued by the governor of San Luis Potosi "would,
in and of itself, constitute an act tantamount to expropriation."2 The Tribunal considered
the "motivation or intent" of the decree irrelevant to the question of expropriation.22
With respect to compensation, the Tribunal found that damages underArticles 1105 and
1110 would be the same since Metalclad had completely lost its investment.23 The Tribunal
rejected a discounted cash-flow analysis "because the landfill was never operative and any
award based on future profits would be whollyspeculative."24 Instead, the Tribunal awarded
damages based on "Metalclad's actual investment" in the project,25 plus 6 percent interest
from the date that Guadalcazar denied the municipal construction permit,26 for a total
award of $16,685,000.27
' Arbitral award, supra note 2, para. 88,40 ILM at 49.17 NAFrA, supra note 1, Art. 1110(1), 32 ILM at 641 ("No party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expro-
priate an investment of an investor of another party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationaliza-
tion or expropriation ofsuch an investment ... except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105 (1); and (d) on payment of compensation ...
'
8 Arbitral award, supra note 2, para. 103, 40 ILM at 50.
'o Id., para. 104, 40 ILM at 50.
o Id., para. 107,40 ILM at 50. The Tribunal found this case similar to Biloune v. Ghana Investments Centre, 95 ILR
183, 207-10 (1989/90), in which the tribunal had found an indirect expropriation caused by a stop-work order
based on the absence of a building permit when the investor hadjustifiably relied on the representations of a gov-
ernment-affiliated entity in beginning construction. Arbitral award, supra note 2, para. 108, 40 ILM at 50-51.21 Arbitral award, supra note 2, paras. 109-11, 40 ILM at 51. Mexico argued that the decree was outside the Tri-
bunal's jurisdiction because it was enacted after the Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim was filed. The Tribunal,
however, found that Metalclad's claims regarding the decree were properly presented under Article 48 of the
Additional Facility Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), at <http://
wv.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm>, which allows the addition of ancillary claims not later than the
claimant's reply. Arbitral award, supra note 2, paras. 64-69, 40 ILM at 45-46. "A contrary holding," the Tribunal
noted, "would require a claimant to file multiple subsequent and related actions and would lead to inefficiency
and inequity." Id., para. 67, 40 ILM at 46.
2 Arbitral award, supra note 2, para. 111, 40 ILM at 51.
23 Id., para. 113, 40 ILM at 51.
2'1d., para. 121,40 ILM at52. Metalclad had claimed approximately $90 million in damages under a discounted
cash-flow analysis. Id., para. 114, 40 ILM at 51.
' Id., para. 122, 40 ILM at 52. The Tribunal subtracted amounts invested by Metalclad prior to 1993, the year
COTERIN was purchased, id., para. 125, 40 ILM at 53, and "bundled" costs incurred on other sites in Mexico, id.,
para. 126, 40 ILM at 53.2
,Id., para. 128, 40 ILM at 53.
27Id, para. 131, 40 ILM at 54.
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Mexico then sought to have the award set aside. Because the site of the arbitration had
been Vancouver, British Columbia,28 Mexico filed its application with the Supreme Court
of that province. Justice David Tysoe held that his review of the award was governed by
British Columbia's International Commercial Arbitration Act (ICAA),29 which is based on
the UNCITRAL [UN Commission on International Trade Law] Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration."° He reasoned that "the primary relationship between Metalclad
and Mexico was one of investing" 1 and that the ICAA applied to relationships of invest-
ing.32 He rejected Mexico and Canada's argument that the standard of review under the
ICAA be determined by a "pragmatic and functional approach."33 He held that the court's
review of the award was limited to the grounds set forth in ICAA Section 34(2) and, more
specifically, to whether "the Tribunal made decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration by deciding upon matters outside Chapter 11."
4
Justice Tysoe then held that the Tribunal's finding of unfair and inequitable treatment
based on a lack of transparency went "beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration
because there are no transparency obligations contained in Chapter 11 "' Agreeing with
the Chapter 11 tribunal's award in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada," and disagreeing with a dif-
ferent tribunal's award in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada,3 7 he reasoned that the text of Ar-
ticle 1105 prohibited only such unfair or inequitable treatment as violated international
law.3" He further reasoned that "[i]n using the words 'international law', Article 1105 is
referring to customary international law" rather than to treaty law.39 He faulted the Tri-
bunal for citing "[n] o authority ... to establish that transparency has become part of cus-
tomary international law."4 In his view, the Tribunal improperly imported into Chapter
11 a transparency obligation from Chapter 18.41
2 Id., para. 11, 40 ILM at38.
SR.S.B.C. 1996, c. 233 [hereinafter ICAA].
" UN Doc. A/40/17, Annex 1 (1985), reprintedin24 ILM 1302 (1985). See Supreme Courtjudgment, supranote
3, paras. 39-56.
3 1Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, para. 46.
32 Id., para. 44. Justice Tysoe relied on Section 1 (6) of the ICAA, which provides that "[a]n arbitration is
commercial if it arises out of a relationship of a commercial nature including, but not limited to, the following:
... (p) investing." Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, para. 41. He also relied on the UNCrTRAL report on its
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: "[t ] he term 'commercial' should be given a wide interpre-
tation so as to cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature." Supreme Courtjudgment,
supra note 3, para. 43 (quoting UN Doc. A/40/17, 24 ILM at 1302 n.**). He rejected Mexico's argument that the
award should be governed instead by British Columbia's Commercial Arbitration Act, which would have allowed
the court to review issues of law decided by the Tribunal. Id., para. 39.
33 Supreme Court judgment, supra note 3, paras. 53-54. In Canada, the pragmatic and functional approach
applies tojudicial review of domestic administrative tribunals. See Pushpanathan v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982.
Canada sought leave to intervene because, as a party to NAFrA, it has an interest in NAFTA's interpretation.
Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, para. 67; see id., para. 50.
35 Id., para. 72.
SeeS.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (NAFrA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Nov. 13, 2000), at <http://vw.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFrA-e.asp>.37 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Merits, Phase 2 (NAFrACh. 11 Arb. Trib. Apr. 10, 2001), at<http://wv.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-e.asp>.
' Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, paras. 60-65. See NAFrA, supra note 1, Art. 1105(1), 32 ILM at 639
("Each Partyshall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international
law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.")
3 Supreme Courtjudgment, supranote 3, para. 62. OnJuly 31,2001, the NAFrAparties exercised their authority
under Article 1131 (2) to issue a binding interpretation of Chapter lI's text. This interpretation confirms both
that "'fair and equitable treatment' ... do[es] not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is re-
quired by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment," and that "[a] determination that there
has been a breach of another provision of the NAFIA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish
that there has been a breach of Article 1105 (1)." NAFrA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Cer-
tain Chapter 11 Provisions, atB(2)-(3) (july31, 2001), at<htp://vv.dfait-maed.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFrA-Interpr-e.asp>.
4 5Supreme Court judgment, supra note 3, para. 68.
" Id., para. 71.
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On the question of expropriation prior to the Ecological Decree, Justice Tysoe found
that "the Tribunal's analysis ofArticle 1105 infected its analysis ofArticle 1110" because the
measures deemed to constitute an expropriation were Mexico's failures to ensure
transparency.42 He held that the award could be sustained, however, on the ground that
the Ecological Decree itself constituted an expropriation.43 He noted that " it] he Tribunal
gave an extremely broad definition of expropriation for the purposes of Article 1110."'
But he also observed that "the definition of expropriation is a question of law with which
this Court is not entitled to interfere under the International [CommercialArbitration Act]."45
Since the Tribunal found that the Ecological Decree "had the effect of barring forever the
operation of Metalclad's landfill," its "conclusion that the issuance of the Decree was an act
tantamount to expropriation is not patently unreasonable. 46
After rejecting Mexico's arguments that the award should be set aside because of Metal-
clad's improper acts47 or because of the Tribunal's failure to address all the questions pre-
sented to it,4"Justice Tysoe set aside the award only to the extent of the interest accrued
between December 5, 1995 (the date on which Guadalcazar denied the municipal con-
struction permit, which was the point at which the Tribunal had determined that Mexico
breached Articles 1105 and 1110) and September 20, 1997 (the date of the Ecological
Decree thatJustice Tysoe held to be an expropriation)."9 Because Metalclad had success-
fully resisted Mexico's application to have the award set aside in its entirety, he ordered
Mexico to pay Metalclad 75 percent of its costs in the proceeding." Mexico filed a notice
of appeal to the British Columbia Court ofAppeal at the end of May, 2001, 5 but the parties
reached a preliminary agreement in June to settle the case for $15,626,260.52
One often thinks of courts as being concerned with setting precedents to guide future
conduct, and of arbitrators as being both less concerned with the content of the law and
4 Id., para. 78.Justice Tysoe also found that the Tribunal did not independently rely on the award in Biloune
v. Ghana Investments Centre 95 ILR 183 (1989/90), and thatBilounewas distinguishable. Supreme Courtjudgment,
supra note 3, para. 80.
"3 Supreme Courtjudgment, supranote 3, paras. 81-105.Justice Tysoe agreed with the Tribunal thatArticle 48
of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 21, allowed Metalclad to add this claim aftersubmitting its claim
to arbitration. I&, paras. 86-91.
Supreme Court judgment, supra note 3, para. 99; see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, para. 99.
".Id., para. 100. Mexico had argued that the court could set aside an award under the ICAA if the award was
"patentlyunreasonable." While expressing some doubt about whether the domestic "patently unreasonable" test
applied under the act,Justice Tysoe found it unnecessary to decide the question because the Tribunal's decision
was not "patently unreasonable." Id., para. 97.
17 Mexico alleged that Metalclad had bribed a Mexican federal official, one of its chief witnesses, regarding
representations that Mexican federal officials made to Metalclad, and that Metalclad had tried to deceive the
Tribunal by claiming as damages expenses unrelated to the landfill.Justice Tysoe found that the first allegation
had not been proven, id., paras. 110-12, and that the Tribunal had not relied on the unrelated expenses in making
its auard, id., paras. 113-17.
4 Article 53(1) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supranote 21, states: "The award shall be made in writing,
shall deal with every question submitted to the Tribunal and shall state the reasons upon which it is based."
Rejecting Mexico's reliance on annulment-committee decisions interpreting an analogous provision in the Inter-
national Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar.
18,1965, 17 UST 1270,575 UNTS 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention],Justice Tysoe said that"[i]tis not reason-
able to require the tribunal to answer each and every argument which is made in connection with the questions
which the tribunal must decide." Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, para. 122. He further noted that setting
aside an aw-ard under the ICAA was discretionary and that, because Mexico had failed to ask the Tribunal itself
to address questions omitted from the award (as permitted by Article 58 of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules),
he would not exercise his discretion to set the award aside on that basis. Id., paras. 131-32.
Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, paras. 134-35.
' Id., para. 137.
51 Metalclad Corp., Press Release (May 24, 2001).
"2 Metalclad Corp., Press Release (June 13, 2001).
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more willing to fashion compromises to satisfy the parties. In Metalciad, however, those
roles were reversed. The arbitral tribunal tried hard to advance international law concern-
ing foreign investmentbyfinding that "fair and equitable treatment" required transparency
and by adopting an expansive definition of expropriation. ItwasJustice Tysoe who gave each
party what it wanted most-setting aside for Mexico the transparency aspects of the award,
while giving Metalclad most of its money-but at the cost of consistency in the application
of British Columbia's ICAA. More broadly, the case may lead one to wonder whether it is
appropriate to allow national courts to review Chapter 11 awards.
Although the relevant part of the award has now been set aside, Metalelad appears to have
been the first arbitral decision to have found a breach of the duty of "fair and equitable
treatment."53 Provisions establishing such a duty have been included in a large number of
bilateral investment treaties.54 To give content to this general concept, the Tribunal looked
to other NAFTA provisions, specifically references in its statement of objectives and in Article
1802 to transparency, and in its preamble and statement of objectives to creating a "pre-
dictable commercial framework" for investment and to increasing "investment opportuni-
ties."55 It was this reasoning, of course, that ledJustice Tysoe to conclude that the Tribunal
had made "decisions on matters beyond the scope of Chapter 1 1.""
Justice Tysoe's ultimate conclusion, however, depended on two propositions: (1) that the
phrase "international law" in Article 1105 means customary international law and not treaty
law;" and (2) that the Tribunal was not applying customary international law when it con-
cluded that "fair and equitable treatment" required transparency.' On the first point, neither
the text ofArticle 1105 nor the Tribunal's award is completely clear. 9 Assuming, however,
that the Tribunal did read "international law" to include treaty law, this interpretation
" Shortly after the MetaladAward, a second NAFIA tribunal found a breach of "fair and equitable treatment"
in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
' UNITEDNATIONS CENTRE ONTRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,BILATRALINvESTMlENTTREATES 41-45 (1988).
The obligation of fair and equitable treatment is also found in Article 1 of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 7 ILM 117, 119 (1968)
("Each party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of the nationals of other Parties.").
The commentary to Article 1 states: "The phrase 'fair and equitable treatment', customary in relevant bilateral
agreements, indicates the standard set by international law for the treatment due by each State with regard to the
property of foreign nationals." Id. at 120.
There has been some dispute aboutwhether the provision for "fair and equitable treatment" in bilateral invest-
ment treaties extends beyond the protections of customary international law. F. A. Mann maintained that it did,
and opposed efforts to equate "fair and equitable treatment" with an international minimum standard. F. A. Mann,
British Treatiesfor the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 BRrr.Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 244 (1981), reprinted in F. A.
MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 234, 238 (1990) ("The terms 'fair and equitable treatment'
envisage conduct which goes far beyond the minimum standard and afford protection to a greater extent and
according to a much more objective standard than anypreviously employed form ofwords."). The NAFrA parties,
however, have now clarified that as used in Article 1105, the phrase "fair and equitable treatment" does not go
beyond the requirements of customary international law. See supra note 39.
" Seesupranote 10 and accompanying text. This analysis reminds one of theWorld Trade Organization (WTO)
Appellate Body's interpretation in United States-mport Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WVTO Doc.
DS58/AB/R (1998), reprinted in 38 ILM 118, 172-74 (1999), of Article XX's similarly general phrase "arbitrary
discrimination" as requiring transparency in light of other provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. See generally Gregory Shaffer, Case Report: United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 93 AJIL 507 (1999).
Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, para. 67; see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, para. 62.
Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, paras. 68-72.
59 Article 1105 provides: "Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in
accordance with international law, including fairand equitable treatment and full protection and security." 32 ILM
at 639. The Tribunal's discussion strongly suggests that it read "international law" to include treaty law, see, e.g.
Arbitral award, supra note 2, paras. 70-71, 40 ILM at 46; id., paras. 74-76, 40 ILM at 47, but the award never
addresses the issue explicitly. OnJuly3l, 2001-after both the Tribunal's award andJusticeTysoe'sjudgment-the
NAFrAparties issued an Article 1131 (2) interpretation ofArticle 1105, limiting it to violations of customary inter-
national law, see supra note 39.
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would seem to involve an issue of law on whichJustice Tysoe had no authority under the
IGAA to second-guess the Tribunal.' Having concluded that Article 1105 was limited to
customary international law, he then faulted the Tribunal for citing "no authority... to
establish that transparency has become part of customary international law."61 In fact, arbi-
trators have based international responsibility on a lack of transparency in a number of
prior decisions,62 and if the Tribunal had taken the trouble to cite them,Justice Tysoe would
have had a much more difficult time setting aside this part of the award.
On the issue of expropriation, the Tribunal read Article 1110 to prohibit "covert or inci-
dental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner,
in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit
of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State." ' a AlthoughJustice
Tysoe characterized this definition as "extremely broad,"' it is worth noting that the award
requires at least a "significant" deprivation of economic benefit, which is arguably more
than the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law definition on which another Chapter 11
tribunal has relied.65 It is unfortunate that the Tribunal did not make clear whether it read
the phrase "take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation" in Article 1110
as going beyond the protections of customary international law.66 It would have required,
however, neither a particularly broad definition of expropriation nor an interpretation of
Article 1110 as extending beyond customary international law to find that a decree that
"had the effect of barring forever the operation of the landfill"67 was an expropriation.'
Although the Metalclad Tribunal could have written a clearer and more persuasive
award, it could hardly have written one more favorable to foreign investors.Justice Tysoe,
" Cf Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, para. 99 (noting that"the definition of expropriation is a question
of law with which this Court is not entitled to interfere under the International CAA").
'A Id., para. 68.
2 See, e.g., Amco v. Indonesia (Resubmitted Case) (1990), 1 ICSID REP. 569, 604-05 (1993) (holding that pro-
cedural irregularities in the revocation of an investment license made the revocation unlawful regardless ofwhether
substantive grounds for its revocation might have existed); Biloune v. Ghana Investments Centre, 95 ILR 183,
207-10 (1989/90) (holding that Ghana could not rely on the absence of a building permitwhere the investor had
justifiably relied on government representations that no permit was necessary); Owners of the Tattler (United
States) v. Great Britain, 6 ILIA.A 48,49-51 (1920) (holding that a lack of clarity in Canadian laws governing the
licensing of U.S. fishing vessels required the British government to pay an indemnity).
,SArbitral award, supra note 2, para. 103, 40 ILM at 50.
'A Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, para. 99.
See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award (NAFrA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 26, 2000), para. 99, 23
HASTINGS INT'L & Coi'. L. REV. 455, 480 (2000), available at <http://wv.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFrA-
e.asp> ("A state is responsible as for an expropriation of property... when it subjects alien property to taxation,
regulation, or other action that is confiscatory, or that prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or unduly delays,
effective enjoyment of an alien's property or its removal from the state's territory" (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §712, cmL g (1987))). Elsewhere, the Pope & Talbot interim award requires that the
deprivation of economic benefit be "substantial." See id., paras. 96,102,23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. at479,
481-82. A third Chapter 11 tribunal seems to have read the notion of expropriation in Article 1110 more narrowly.
See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, paras. 280-81 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Nov. 13, 2000), at
<http://wwv.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-e.asp> ("In general, the term 'expropriation' carries with it the
connotation of a 'taking' by a government-type authority of a person's 'property' with a view to transferring
ownership of that property to another person .... The general body ofprecedent usually does not treat regulatory
action as amounting to expropriation. Regulatory conduct by public authorities is unlikely to be the subject of
legitimate complaint under Article 1110 of the NAFrA, although the Tribunal does not rule out that possibility.").
' The award alternates between the phrase "measure tantamount to expropriation" and "indirect expropri-
ation." CompareArbitral award, supra note 2, paras. 104, 111, 40 ILM at 50-51, with id., paras. 107, 112,40 ILM at
50-51. See also Supreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, para. 77 ("It is unclear whether the Tribunal equated a
,measure tantamount to expropriation' with 'indirect expropriation' or whether it made two separate findings of
expropriation."). Other Chapter 11 tribunals have agreed with the three NAFrA governments thatArticle 1110 is
meant to codify, rather than to expand upon, customaryinternational law. SeePope & Talbo Interim Award, paras.
96, 103-04, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COUP. L. REV. at 479,482; S.D. Myers, paras. 285-86.
'7 Arbitral award, supra note 2, para. 109, 40 ILM at 51.
'x See Supreme Court judgment, supra note 3, pam. 100 ("In my view, the Tribunal's conclusion that the issu-
ance of the Decree was an act tantamount to expropriation is not patently unreasonable.").
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by contrast, fashioned a compromise, setting aside the transparency portion of the award
for Mexico but letting Metalclad keep most of the money that the Tribunal had awarded
it. Yet he could not accomplish this result without some inconsistency. He correctly held
that British Columbia's ICAA governed the award,69 which meant that he was not entitled
to review the Tribunal's legal decisions. Accordingly, he observed that he could not
interfere with the Tribunal's definition of expropriation because it was a legal issue.7"
Nevertheless, he overrode the Tribunal on another legal issue: the question whether
"international law" in Article 1105 is limited to customary international law." This
inconsistency may have been expedient, but it was not principled.
In a prior case report, I suggested that it might be advisable to create an appellate body
for Chapter 11 cases?72 Metalcladillustrates this need. A national court's review of a Chapter
11 award during a proceeding to set aside or to enforce the award will typically be limited
to such questions as whether the tribunal decided matters outside the scope of the sub-
mission to arbitration.75 A national court typically will not be able to correct errors of law
made by the tribunal,74 whereas an appellate body could be given such authority.75 Both for
this reason and because different Chapter 11 awards will come before different national
courts, national-court review also cannot ensure a consistent interpretation of NAFTA.
Moreover, as Metalclad itself illustrates-on issues ranging from the meaning of "fair and
equitable treatment" under Article 1105 to the definition of expropriation under Article
1110-there are numerous questions on which Chapter 11 tribunals have reached different
interpretations.76 An appellate body to which all Chapter 11 awards were appealable could
provide needed consistency.77 It would also bring to bear greater expertise on questions of
international law than is typically found in municipal courts.78 Finally, an appellate body
would ensure neutrality in the review of Chapter 11 awards. It was fortunate that in Metaldad
the place of arbitration, and thus the court that was asked to review the award, was in neither
the claimant's nor the respondent's country. In S.D. Myers v. Canada, by contrast, the place
of arbitration was Toronto, and Canada has applied to the Federal Court of Canada to set
aside the award to the U.S. claimant.79 This application may create the appearance of bias if
Canada is successful80
69 See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.7
oSupreme Courtjudgment, supra note 3, para. 99.
71 Id. para. 62.
William S. Dodge, Case Report: Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, 95 AJIL 186, 191-92 (2001).
7 See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
74 But see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
' The WTO Appellate Body has authority to review panel decisions for errors of law but not of fact. Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, Art. 17(6), Marrakesh
AgreementEstablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, THERESULTS OFTHEURUGUAYROUND OFMULTI-
ILATERALTRADE NEGOTIATION: THE LEGALTEXTS 404, 418 (1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1226, 1236 (1994).
7 See supra notes 36-38, 63-66, and accompanying text. For discussion of other interpretative issues on which
Chapter 11 tribunals have differed, see Dodge, supra note 72, at 190-91.
77 Interpretive consistency may also be achieved through Article 1131 (2), which allows the three NA1 IA parties
to issue binding interpretations of the text. This provision was used for the first time onJuly 31, 2001. See supra
note 39.
7 There are few judges in national courts whose knowledge of international law can compare with that of the
arbitrators in Metalclad, see supra note 2.79 See Canada Appeals NAFTA Chapter 11 Case, Arguing That Panel Exceeded ItsJurisdiction, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. 273
(Feb. 15, 2001).
' An alternative method of review would be the annulment procedure under Article 52 of the ICID Con-
vention. ICSID Convention, supra note 48, Art. 52. Chapter 11 contemplates that awards made under the ICSID
Convention would be subject to this procedure, seeNAFfA, supra note 1, Art. 1136(3) (a), 32 ILM at 646, but since
neither Canada nor Mexico is a party to the ICSID Convention, this method of review is currently unavailable.
ICSID's annulment procedure would provide expertise and neutrality, but it could not provide the interpretive
consistency of an appellate body.
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One hopes that the NAFrA parties will see fit to remedy this situation, either by amending
NAFrA itself or by providing for an appellate body in the investment chapter of the instruments
establishing a free trade area of the Americas, which might supersede NAFTA Chapter 11.
WILLIAM S. DODGE
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
Criminal law-Italian constitutional law-European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced
Persons-agreement regarding confinement of a transferred prisoner-effect and constitutionality
of such an agreement
BARALDINI.Judgment No. 73/01. Gazz. Uff., 1 Serie Speciale, No. 13 (March 28, 2001), at
<http://www.cortecostituzionale.it>.
Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court of Italy), March 22, 2001.
Following breast cancer surgery in a Rome hospital, Silvia Baraldini-an Italian national
who had been transferred from the United States to Italy for the purpose of serving the
remainder of her prison sentence in Italy-requested her release from prison while she
received radiation treatments or chemotherapy. 2 By order of November 24, 2000,' the
Tribunale di sorveglianza (Supervisory Court) of Rome for the District of Lazio, on its own
motion, brought a challenge of constitutionality against the Italian statute (Transfer Imple-
mentation Law) 4 implementing the 1983 Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer
of Sentenced Persons (Strasbourg Convention) . According to the court, although Baraldini's
health warranted a temporary suspension of her sentence on humanitarian grounds,6 such
a suspension was precluded by the conditions of transfer agreed to by Italy (U.S.-Italy
transfer agreement) in accordance with Article 3 (1) (f) of the Strasbourg Convention. The
Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court), however, held that the Strasbourg Convention
does not authorize the kind of agreement reached by Italy and the United States, and
accordingly found no reason to address the constitutionality of the Transfer Imple-
mentation Law.8 Later, the U.S. Department ofJustice, in the course of the proceedings
' See U.S. Dep't ofJustice Statement Regarding the Transfer of Silvia Baraldini (Aug. 24, 1999), at <http://
iwiv.usdoj.gov>. In 1983, Baraldini was convicted in the Southern District of New York of racketeering and
conspiracy under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§1961-1968, for
her participation in the affairs of a terrorist group. She was sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment (with ajudicial
recommendation against parole) and fined $50,000. The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Court ofAp-
peals for the Second Circuit, United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1985). In a second, subsequent trial
(Eastern District of NewYork, decidedApril 19,1984), Baraldini was convicted of serious criminal contemptunder
18 U.S.C. §401 and sentenced to 3 additionalyears in prison, to be served consecutively with her previous, 40-year
sentence. The case is discussed in Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 85 AJIL 338 (1991).
On October 20, 2000, Baraldini had filed a request with the Tribunale di sorveglianza (Supervisory Court) of
Rome for the suspension of her sentence under Article 146(1) (3) of the Italian Criminal Code, which provides
for "mandatory" suspension of the execution of sentences in case of serious illness ("mandatory respite") or, in
the alternative, for house arrest on medical grounds.
Trib. sorv., Nov. 24, 2000, Ord. No. 860/00, Gazz. Uff., 1 Serie Speciale, No. 3,Jan. 17,2001 [hereinafter Super-
visory Court order]. All translations of the Bardalini court cases are by the author.
Law No. 334,July 25, 1988, Gazz. Uff., No. 188, Aug. 11, 1988, [hereinafter Transfer Implementation Law].
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, ETS No. 112 (entered into forceJuly 1,1985)
[hereinafter Strasbourg Convention]. The Convention and an updated list ofsignatures and ratifications are avail-
able online at <http://conventions.coe.int>.
'The SupervisoryCourt favored the application ofa discretionary form ofsuspension in accordance with Article
146(1) (2) of the Italian Criminal Code ("discretionary respite"), instead of the "mandatory respite" provided for
under Article 146(1) (3)-which, according to the Court, requires an "irretrievable" health condition that"fortu-
nately here does not exist." Supervisory Court order, supra note 3, para. 3.2.
" The terms of the agreement concluded between Italy and the United States for the purpose of Baraldini's
transfer to Italy are described infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
Corte cost., Mar. 22, 2001, Judgment No. 73/01, Gazz. Uff., 1 Serie Speciale, No. 13 (Mar. 28, 2001), at
<http://wivw.cortecostituzionale.it>, reprinted in 84 RIVISTADI DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE 489 (2001) [hereinafter
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